Latin America
Related: About this forumFor a Glimpse of Plan Central America's Future, Look to Colombia
For a Glimpse of Plan Central America's Future, Look to Colombia
Posted 27 July 2015 17:51 GMT
In an attempt to curb the flow of thousands of unaccompanied children who flee to the US, the Obama administration has proposed Plan Central America: a US $1 billion aid program for improving the economic and security situation in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, collectively known as the Northern Triangle. The US Congress is expected to vote on it later this summer.
When Vice President Joe Biden presented the plan in an op-ed in the New York Times, he argued for increased training and support for police and armed forces, measures to increase transparency and accountability including strengthening tax collection and encouraging foreign direct investment through market liberalization.
The plan, the vice president wrote, will be modelled after Plan Colombia, continuing a Washington tradition of coupling neoliberal projects with military aid. A similar approach was applied in Mexico with the 2008 implementation of the Mérida Initiative. All three plans have in common a belief that complex social and economic problems, and the outcomes of these, such as a rampant narcotics industry, can be resolved through ramped-up military and security spending.
Revisiting Plan Colombia can be instructive as to what could lie ahead. For over ten years, it provided Colombia with over US $9 billion in military and financial aid aimed at fighting the narcotics industry. As one of the original designers, Biden argues that the program led to notable improvements in security, governance and human rights.
More:
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2015/07/27/for-a-glimpse-of-plan-central-americas-future-look-to-colombia/
Judi Lynn
(160,656 posts)From the O.P. posted above:
Emphasis on militarization
. . .
The most important goal was to crack down on armed groups involved in the drug trade. Officially this was done through counter-narcotics operations, but in reality the Colombian Armed Forces were trained by US military personnel in counterinsurgency tactics, or COIN. Their main target were the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and to a lesser extent the National Liberation Army (ELN). Little evidence exists, however, that the FARC were actively involved in the drug trade, although they often taxed coca crops, especially where they functioned as the local government. Nonetheless, Plan Colombia presented the FARC as narcoguerrillas, a moniker switched to narcoterrorists immediately after 9/11, in order to fit them within the global War on Terror framework.
On the other hand, Plan Colombia did not focus on the notorious Colombian paramilitary forces, collectively known as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). These paramilitaries had strong links with several high-ranking Colombian officials, including members of Congress, and direct family members of former President Uribe. The long-time leader of the AUC, Carlos Castaño, who was murdered in 2004, revealed publicly that 70 percent of the AUCs income came directly from trafficking. Nevertheless, the AUC were not a target in the counter-narcotics operations of Plan Colombia.
Human rights violations skyrocketed. By 2001 the military had managed to push a National Security bill through Congress, which reduced outside scrutiny and limited investigation of human rights accusations. Immediately after his 2002 inauguration, President Uribe declared a state of internal commotion which greatly expanded military authority. A 2003 anti-terrorist bill legally allowed the military to intercept communications, search private property, and arrest civilians without warrants.
Throughout Plan Colombia the military used the paramilitaries to conduct operations akin to dirty war tactics reminiscent of the right-wing death squads active throughout Latin America from the 1960s to the 1980s. Murder, torture and disappearances of anyone suspected of being connected to the guerrillas were common. A program that rewarded the capture or killing of guerrillas led to the murder of innocent civilians, their corpses subsequently dressed in guerrilla uniforms. According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, some 3,000 innocent civilians were killed as such false positives between 2004 and 2008.
. . .
Rod Beauvex
(564 posts)...on legalizing pot, which, while not solving all the problems, would go far towards stabilizing the region.
But no one gets rich off that.
Bacchus4.0
(6,837 posts)Of course, not sure how much credit can go to the US for Colombia's turn around.