First off, I am not belittling you. I am stunned that you would link to Senator Levin's letter, but actually cite a line and not the most damning parts of the letter. Second, the first two references are based on the smear job by the journalist who did not do his job to begin with and who did not have the courage to stand with his source. So, dare I say they are not relevent.
But let's address Levin's letter.. why were they working so hard to silence Brett if he was lying? That completely undercuts the smear job done on him in retaliation in that book... Senator Levin's letter alone is enough to make this argument a moot point.
let's cite it here in full (emphasis added)
Mr. President, in May of this year, the New York Times ran an article about a 1988 incident involving a federal prisoner by the name of Brett Kimberlin and allegations that the Bureau of Prisons had tried to silence him for political purposes. Although the article appeared almost four years after the incident, it contained information that had recently come to light in a related court case. It was the first time I had read about the Kimberlin matter in any detail, and I found it startling.
The Times reported that when Kimberlin began making allegations involving then vice presidential candidate Dan Quayle just before the 1988 election -- and the press began to pay attention to those allegations -- the Bureau of Prisons took a number of actions to silence him. The Times reported that after calls from the Bush-Quayle campaign to the Justice Department, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons Michael Quinlan took a highly unusual course of action. He personally canceled a press conference arranged by local prison officials in response to several press requests to interview Kimberlin. He then personally ordered Kimberlin placed in administrative detention, or "the hole" as it is referred to by the prisoners. Both events took place only days before the November 1988 election.
The prison released Kimberlin from detention the following day. But when he later attempted to give an interview to a group of reporters by telephone, the Bureau put Kimberlin back into administrative detention for a week, until well after the election. A month later, when the press again began to pay attention to Kimberlin's allegations, the Bureau again returned him to administrative detention.
The Times article suggested that the Bureau of Prisons had violated prison rules in its effort to silence Kimberlin. Such an allegation, if true, would violate our fundamental principle of a fair and open government.
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, I initiated a subcommittee investigation into the facts behind the New York Times article and the Kimberlin detentions. Let me make clear that the focus of this investigation was not to examine the validity of the allegations made by Kimberlin but solely whether, in 1988, the Bureau of Prisons and the Department of Justice engaged in improper conduct in the Kimberlin matter to advance a political purpose.
After my Subcommittee staff reviewed press accounts, public documents in a pending court case filed by Kimberlin against key officials in the Bureau of Prisons and the Department of Justice, and other information, I sent a list of questions to Mr. Quinlan, Mr. Loye Miller who headed the public affairs office of the Department of Justice in 1988, and the Justice Department itself. My questions were not answered specifically or by the person to whom they were addressed; the Justice Department responded in narrative form on behalf of all three addressees.
I responded with a letter identifying the many questions that had not been answered and requesting interviews with Mr. Quinlan and Mr. Miller. The Justice Department answered, again on behalf of both Mr. Quinlan and Mr. Miller, denying my request for interviews, but providing some additional information. The additional information did not, however, lay to rest important questions in this matter.
the rest of Senator Levin's letter follows:
Those questions go to a fundamental concern: guaranteeing that the power of our federal government is not used to silence individuals for political purposes.
Without interviewing Mr. Quinlan and Mr. Miller, I can go no further in the investigation. Were these ordinary times, I would convene a Subcommittee hearing and call these individuals and others to testify under oath to the facts pertaining to the cancellation of Kimberlin's press conference and his detentions by the Bureau of Prisons.
However, these are not ordinary times -- we are in the final month of a Presidential election -- and holding a hearing would probably lead to charges of politics. That would deflect the public's attention and the attention of the agencies involved from the important substance of the issues involved. Consequently, I have decided not to hold a hearing at this time, but to present my findings as well as the outstanding questions to the Inspector General of the Department of Justice.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my letter dated today to the Inspector General and a report describing my investigation be included in the Record in full immediately following these remarks.
The report addresses four key events in the Kimberlin chronology, all flashpoints of what appears to be improper government action to isolate Kimberlin. These are: the decision by Bureau Director Quinlan on November 4, 1988, to cancel a press conference arranged by local prison officials and three separate decisions by the Bureau of Prisons on November 4, November 7, and December 22, 1988, to confine Kimberlin in administrative detention. The information we have about each of these events is based upon our review of depositions taken in the pending civil case, court pleadings and decisions, our own interviews, and the responses to our questions by the Department of Justice.
Mr. President, after reviewing that evidence and given the refusal of the Justice Department to allow interviews of Mr. Quinlan and Mr. Miller, I can only conclude that the cancellation of Kimberlin's November 4th press conference and his subsequent administrative detentions were actions taken by the Bureau of Prisons for political purposes. The primary purpose was to keep Kimberlin's allegations that he sold marijuana to Vice President Quayle in the 1970's out of the 1988 campaign. Whether these actions occurred on the independent initiative of Mr. Quinlan or other federal employees or at the request of the Bush-Quayle campaign is a question that remains unanswered.
The evidence of political considerations in the Kimberlin matter is as follows:
We know that the most senior officials in the Bush-Quayle campaign -- Jim Baker, Lee Atwater, Fred Fielding, Stu Spencer and Joe Canzeri, as well as Vice President Quayle himself -- knew about Kimberlin's allegations and his efforts to publicize them.
We know the Bush-Quayle campaign believed that the public's attention to the Kimberlin allegations could have serious consequences. Mark Goodin, the campaign's deputy press secretary, has stated in a deposition that:
"Oh, I don't think there was any doubt about what could happen. I have seen this kind of thing play out before. I made it very clear when I approached other senior officials of the campaign that it could be -- it was something that we needed to take seriously and deal with seriously because of its potential for adverse publicity."
Mr. Goodin conveyed that sentiment to the Justice Department in a conversation described in a 1989 memorandum prepared by Mr. Miller in which he states that Mr. Goodin "noted the obvious: that the closer to the Tuesday election that the story were to break, the more attention it was likely to get, and the better the chance that it could have at least some adverse effect on the Bush-Quayle chances." Stu Spencer, Quayle's campaign manager, stated in his deposition that he, too, took the Kimberlin allegations seriously because, "Late charges can be devastating."
We know that the campaign monitored the situation closely. Mr. Goodin, the campaign's key link to the Justice Department, stayed in constant touch with the Department on the Kimberlin matter. As Mr. Goodin stated in his deposition:
"Over a fairly substantial period of time, it is fair to characterize my contact with the Department of Justice as fairly close contact. ... It's certainly fair to say that I kept close tabs on the issue through the Department of Justice."
A December 1988 memorandum prepared by Mr. Quinlan for his superiors also reveals that at least one unidentified person from the campaign -- Mr. Goodin has said it wasn't him -- telephoned the Bureau directly to inquire about Kimberlin's media contacts.
We know the Justice Department, through Mr. Miller, agreed to keep the campaign informed and, in fact, kept Mr. Goodin apprised of key developments in Kimberlin's attempts to reach the press with his allegations. Mr. Goodin then kept Mr. Baker and other top campaign officials apprised of the key developments.
We know that the campaign, the Justice Department and the Bureau of Prisons fielded frequent calls from the press in the final days of the 1988 election about the Kimberlin allegations.
We know that Mr. Quinlan became personally involved to a highly unusual, if not unprecedented, degree in the decisions made with respect to Kimberlin: first, he personally ordered the cancellation of the press conference arranged by the prison; second, he personally ordered Kimberlin placed in administrative detention; and third, he requested and reviewed transcripts of Kimberlin's telephone calls during this period.
We know that Mr. Quinlan was aware of and concerned about Kimberlin's contacts with the media. The December 1988 memorandum he prepared for his superiors began, for example, by stating that, "As you know, Kimberlin's allegations ... have received additional media attention in the last several days." Later in that memorandum, Mr. Quinlan pointed with satisfaction to the fact that his earliest decision in the Kimberlin matter, to allow an interview by NBC, resulted in "no news outlet carr the story in the pre-election period."
We know that there are serious gaps and inconsistencies in the Bureau's explanations of the substantive basis for its actions in the Kimberlin matter:
First, Mr. Quinlan canceled the November 4th press conference arranged by local prison officials by citing a purported policy against inmate press conferences, which local prison officials had never heard of, has never been put in writing, and was not applied by the Bureau to monthly press conferences held by a former Member of Congress incarcerated in federal prison in 1986 and 1987.
Second, Mr. Quinlan justified placing Kimberlin in detention on November 4th by claiming he'd received information that Kimberlin feared for his safety from other inmates, despite a contemporaneous finding by the prison that no such inmate threat existed, and despite inconsistent and questionable evidence of how that information reached the Director late at night in an out-of-town hotel.
Third, the Bureau's decision to return Kimberlin to detention on November 7th, the day before the election, relies on unclear documentation and suspect timing, lacks an identifiable authorizing official, and has been justified by inconsistent explanations.
Fourth, the Bureau's explanations for placing Kimberlin in detention on December 22nd were found unconvincing by an independent hearing officer who determined that Kimberlin was innocent of the rule infractions charged.
Key individuals must be directed to explain these inconsistencies, contradictions and gaps in the Kimberlin story. Because the Justice Department has refused to permit Subcommittee interviews of two of these individuals, Mr. Quinlan and Mr. Miller, and a Subcommittee hearing is not feasible at this time, I've taken the investigation as far as I can. That is why I have asked the Inspector General to become involved.
If the conclusion of the Inspector General is similar to mine -- that the Bureau took these actions against Kimberlin to isolate him for political purposes -- the Inspector General should identify the federal officials involved and recommend appropriate disciplinary action.
So we are left with the original crime, which he served 8 of his 51 year sentence... odd, no?
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